Purpose -This paper seeks to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance of listed Ghanaian companies. Design/Methodology/approach -The study adopts a longitudinal and cross-sectional data set of 20 sampled companies over a period of 5 years. The data was analysed using a panel regression and ANOVA analysis to establish the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Corporate governance is defined in terms of three indices -board structure, ownership structure and corporate control while firm performance is measured by return on assets, return on equity, net profit margin and Tobin's Q. Findings -The findings of the study revealed that, top twenty ownership structures and female representation on board have significant positive relationship with firm performance, while board independence and frequency of audit committee meeting have negative significant relationship with firm performance.
Introduction
It is evidence that Good corporate governance provides the ability to improve competitive advantage, efficiency and effectiveness of companies (Maher and Anderson, 1999) . As a result, stakeholders have begun to realise the importance of good corporate governance practices in protecting their interests. The empirical work on corporate governance and its impact on firm performance has growing remarkably in recent years especially in developing countries. There are little research has looked at corporate governance in developing countries such as Ghana. Previous studies also provide mixed findings on the directions of causality between corporate governance and firm performance. In this context, this paper attempt to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in Ghana. The Ghanaian business environment is characterised by a good level of growth and further growth is expected because of the recent discovery of oil in the country. This has resulted in the increased awareness of the effects of corporate governance on the performance of firms in Ghana. The study adopts a longitudinal and cross-sectional data set of 20 sampled companies over a period of 5 years. Our findings are useful for the policy community who are concerned with the impact of governance structure on corporate disclosure.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of prior literature, which explore the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, and development of hypothesis. Section 3 presents our research design. The main results are discussed in section 4, and we provide a summary of our results and conclusion in section 5.
Background of Ghana
Ghana, a developing country located in the West African Sub region is categorised amongst countries often faced with poor economic performance, weak legal and regulatory frameworks, illiquid stock markets and very frequent market intervention by government agencies (Tsamenyi et al, 2007) . These structural characteristics have led to the demand for good corporate governance in Ghana and similar countries ). Ghana does not have a specific corporate governance code such as the United Kingdom (principles based) and the United States (rules based). This means that companies tend to operate on a different set of corporate governance guidelines (Koranteng, 2004) . Nonetheless, the Ghana Stock Exchange and the Security Exchange Commission serve as the primary regulators of all listed companies ensuring that all listing requirements and regulations are adhered to while also ensuring that these companies adhere to good corporate governance measures. In this regard, emphasis must be placed on the effects good corporate governance has on firm performance to help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of listed firms.
Corporate governance and Firm Performance
The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1999) , defines corporate governance as the mechanism or the system by which businesses and organisations are directed and controlled. The OECD indicates that the adoption of good corporate practices has the ability to increase and restore shareholder confidence as well as economic efficiency and growth (OECD, 2004) . According to Sheikh and Rees (1995) , the concept of corporate governance is grounded mainly in the accountability of directors to shareholders in lieu of their responsibilities in ensuring wealth maximisation. Corporate governance is a set of mechanisms that aims to direct managerial decisions and helps improve the firms' performance (Jarboui, Guetat, Boujelbene, 2015) , while Vintila and Gherghina (2012) emphasised the fact that corporate governance mechanisms have the ability to mitigate the agency problem by aligning the interests of managers and directors with those of the shareholders. A number of previous studies investigated the role of governance mechanisms in resolving conflicts of interest between shareholder and managers and in improving performance (see e.g. Cubbin & Leech, 1983; Aydin, Sayim, &Yalama, 2007) . However, the findings of these empirical studies are contradictory and inconclusive. The indecisive nature of the literature as it relates to whether there is any relationship existing between the firm performance and corporate governance is been operated calls for this paper.
Board of Directors
The key role of the board of directors is to monitor management decisions. Cadbury report (1992) identifies the board of directors' responsibilities as setting the company's strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. Boards of directors are typically measured by two characteristics: board composition and board size with either characteristic, there is a trade-off between more information and more effective decision-making. According to agency theory, non-executive directors can play key role in monitoring management performance. Having a higher proportion of outside non-executive directors on the board would result in better monitoring of the activities by the board and limit managerial opportunism (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Thus, it is expected that having more outside directors on the board will enhance the firm performance. Previous studies find relationship between board composition and profitability of firms in the sense that as the number of independent directors increased the higher the level of firm performance (Abor and Biekpe,2007) . These findings emphasise the need for non-executive directors. and Lo et al., (2010) added that greater board independence results in the reduction of fraudulent activities and the misappropriation of scare resources. As implied by resource dependence theory , non-executive directors with their expertise, knowledge, prestige and contacts, provide firms with links to external environment ( Wang and Hussainey, 2013) . We expect a positive association between the number of non-executive directors and form performance. This lead to our first hypothesis:
H1:
A positive association exists between number of non-executive directors and firm performance.
It has been argued that larger boards result in high performance due to the increased opportunities arising from diversity -gender, level of experiences, skills, expertise and nationality, networking and planning previous studies have investigated the association between board size and firm performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Dalton and Dalton, 2005; Adam and Mehran, 2005) . Earlier works on the relationship between board size and firm performance have often been attributed to Lipton and Lorsch (1992) , Jensen (1993) who supports smaller boards as being more efficient than larger ones. Yermack (1996) examines large US firms from 1984 to 1991 and finds a strong negative effect of board size on Tobin's q. Eisenberg et al., (1997) present evidence that a negative correlation between board size and profitability. In the same vein, Jensen (2012) , found that keeping small boards can help to improve their performance and concludes that when board gets beyond seven or eight members they are less likely to function effectively. We expect that large board of directors leads to low performance. This lead to our second hypothesis: H2: A negative association exists between size of directors and firm performance. Van der Walt and Ingley (2003) define diversity in the context of corporate governance as the structure of the board and the combination of the different qualities, characteristics and expertise of the individual members in relation to decision-making and other processes within the board. The level of Board diversity affects their decisions and might also contribute to the discussion, exchange of ideas and performance of the group (Kang, Cheng and Grey, 2007) .
Gender diversity on board is a highly debated topic, which has received a tremendous amount of attention of policy makers, researchers and shareholders (Chapple and Humphrey 2014) .
Davies Report (2011) has offered a business case for increasing the number of women on corporate boards and its potential impact on performance. In fact, substantial research is epidemic in the women-on-boards and suggests that companies with a strong female representation at board and top management level perform better than those without. (e.g. Adams et al. 2009; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 2008; Farrell and Hersch 2005; Carter et al. 2003; Erhardt et al. 2003) . Hence, it is expected that more female directors on board will increase improve the firm performance. This lead to our third hypothesis:
H3:
A positive association exist between the presence of female on board of directors and firm performance
Ownership Structure
The ownership structure has the ability to shape the corporate governance system in any given country (Zhuang, 1999) . The ownership structure is presented in terms of block holder ownership and state ownership. Substantial shareholders are expected to have the power and incentive to monitor management. The level of concentration of the ownership structure has implications such as large shareholders dominating decision making to the detriment of small shareholders (Kuznetsov and Muravyev, 2001) . In other words, companies with concentrated ownership have less agency problems (Alnajjar and Abed , 2014; Zhuang,1999) . However, the influence of block holder ownership on firm performance has received mixed results.
Previous studies examined the relationship between and performance and find positive relation exists between ownership concentration and profitability (Cubin & Leech,1983; Xu and Wang, 1999; Hiraki et al., 2003; Heugens et al., 2009 (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) . Similarly, Shah et al. (2012) demonstrating that an increase in the concentration levels of ownership structure leads to a reduction in good practises by firms. Nevertheless, we expect that block holder ownership led to high firm performance. This lead to our fourth hypothesis:
H4: A positive association between block holder ownership and firm performance.
The association between State ownership and firm performance has motivated many empirical studies. Porta et al. (1999) argue that the incentive for government to own shares in firm might be related to achieving political objectives rather than economic objectives. On the other hand Eng and Mark (2003) clime that government ownership reduce the problems of asymmetric information that result from the imperfect information about the value of the company. However, the empirical evidence for the relationship between firm performance and state ownership has been mixed results. Some studies report a positive effect of government ownership on firm performance (e.g. Bos 1991; Jiang et al., 2008; Liao and Young, 2012) , while other studies present a negative effect (Chen et al., 2005 , Wei, 2007 Mahmood and Abbas, 2011) . Based on the above discussion we expect that State ownership lead to lower performance. This lead to our fifth hypothesis: H5: A negative association between State ownership and firm performance.
Audit Committee
The role of the Audit committee in most companies is to monitor the integrity of their financial statement as well as the announcements of financial performance. Okeahalam, (2004) added that it is the duty of the audit committee to bring to the notice of the board of directors all issues that require special attention. The size of the audit committee is considered to be relevant to the effective discharge of its duties (Cadbury Committee, 1992) .
A number of corporate governance reports mandates that audit committees consist of a minimum of four directors (e.g. BRC, 1999; New York Stock Exchange, 2002; CMA, 2006) .
It is argued that a larger committee has greater organizational status and authority and a wider knowledge base (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993; Braiotta, 2000) . There are number of studies reported positive relationship between board size and firm performance (see. e.g. Dalton et al., 1999; Saleh et al., 2007; Mir & Souad, 2008) . On the other hand, Vafeas (1999) suggest that larger audit committee can lead to inefficient governance, because of yielding frequent meetings, which leads to increased expenses, and therefore negatively affect firm performance. Thus, large audit committee board is more likely to result in low firm performance. This lead to our sixth hypothesis: H6: A negative association between audit committee size and firm performance.
The frequency of Audit committee meeting is used in prior research to measure the effectiveness of audit meeting. It has been argued that inactive audit committees are unlikely to monitor management effectively (Menon and Williams, 1994) . Saleh et al., (2007) The data set for the research was primarily secondary data consisting of longitudinal and cross-sectional data. The sources of data include annual reports and financial statements of the listed companies. Variables such as return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), net profits margin (NPM) and Tobin's Q (TBQ) were adopted. Director information and Board Structure, Board gender, Ownership and Corporate Control information was acquired from the websites and annual reports of the various companies with additional information also sought directly from the Ghana Stock Exchange. A pool panel regression and an ANOVA analysis was used to establish the presence or otherwise of a significant relationship between the dependent and independent variables while controlling for age ,size and leverage ratio of the firm. In this study, corporate governance structure was considered as the independent variable while corporate performance was taken to be the dependent variable. The study adopts four performance indicators to provide a deeper insight and basis of comparison. Tables 1.0 and 2.0 present the operational definitions adopted in the research. Number of independent directors in relation to total number of directors.
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Model
The research adopts a model similar to that adopted by Abor and Biekpe (2007) The various models are defined as follows. external board members (non-executive directors). This implies that on average, there are more non-executive directors than executive directors, suggesting a high level of independence on the board which conforms to the Ghana Stock Exchange listing requirements of a minimum of four (4) non-executive directors on a company's board. Also, the ratio of male board members to female board members was found to be 7:1 which implies that board diversity among listed firms is low.
As shown in Table 4 .1 on average, the top twenty shareholders hold about 83.26% of the company's shares thus ownership is concentrated among a few shareholders. This result corroborates the findings of Salami (2011) who found that most of the listed companies on the Ghanaian stock exchange had very high ownership concentrations. The analysis also reveals that the state ownership on average is about 9.75% of total shares outstanding implying low government influence among listed firms on the Ghana Stock Exchange. The analysis on corporate control also indicates that on average, listed companies have 4 members on their audit committee ranging from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 7 and the audit committee held an average of 8 meetings annually, varying between 1 to 15 times in a year. capitalization. Finally, the average debt to equity ratio for the sampled companies was reported to be 0.7497971.
Multicollinearity Test
A multicollinearity test is conducted to ascertain whether the independent variables have a strong correlation among themselves. The test is important because the reliability of the results is questionable in the event of the existence of multicollinearity. All other things being equal, researchers desire higher levels of tolerance, as low levels of tolerance are known to adversely affect the results associated with a multiple regression analysis. Various recommendations for acceptable levels of tolerance have been published in the literature.
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) , the minimum level of tolerance recommended is a value of 0.10 whereas Menard (1995) recommended the use of 0.20 as the minimum value and 0.25 by Huber and Stephens (1993) . Table 4 .2 shows that the tolerance levels are all higher than the minimum recommended values and therefore implies that the level of correlation between the independent variables are small and will not increase the standard errors significantly. Therefore multicollinearity is not a problem in the models estimated below.
Regression Results Table 4 .3 indicates that Board size (BS) has a negative but insignificant relationship with ROA. The negative association suggests that companies with a relatively lower board size tend to perform better with regards to ROA than companies with a larger board size. The findings of the negative association consolidates the findings in Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) who concluded that smaller boards are more efficient as against larger boards. The regression results also reveal a (p<0.05) significant negative (-26.7383) relationship between board independence and ROA. This suggests that listed companies with a relatively lower number of non-executive directors tends to perform better in terms of ROA than companies with a larger percentage of non-executive directors. This result contradicts Abor and Biekpe (2007) who found a significant positive relationship between board independence and firm profitability. Table 4 .3 revealed that Board gender (BG) has a negative but insignificant impact on ROA. It also shows that the number of times audit committee meetings were held had an influence on performance as given by the p-value of 0.032. Thus the number of times audit meetings were held in a firm negatively affected ROA. The number of members on the audit committee does not have a significant impact on ROA at a 5% level of confidence as its p-value was 0.690.
Results on the impact of ownership structure on performance are also presented in the table above. The proportion of shares held by the top 20 shareholders has a positive and significant impact on Return on Assets (ROA) at the 5% level of confidence. This result agrees with Zhuang (1999) who indicates that companies with higher concentrated ownership structures perform better than their counterparts. Ratio of state owned shares to total shares outstanding (SOS) however has a positive but insignificant impact on ROA as its p-value was 0.449. (2000) and Carter et al. (2003) .
The number of audit meetings held shows no significant influence on performance (NPM) since the p-value was 0.242. The coefficient of the number of members on the audit committee is 3.277553 and its p-value is 0.059, this suggests that the size of audit committee does not influence Net Profit Margin at the 5% level of confidence. Considering the impact of ownership structure on performance, Table 4 Table 4 .6 also reports the coefficient of the number of member on the audit committee as having a negative but insignificant impact on Tobin's Q as its p-value was 0.499 suggesting that the size of audit committee does not influence Tobin's Q at the 5% level of confidence.
In terms of ownership structure the proportion of outstanding shares held by the top twenty percent of shareholders has a positive and a significant influence on Tobin's Q. The positive relationship supports the findings of Zhuang (1999) who asserted that high level of ownership concentration increases shareholder effectiveness in monitoring the activities of management.
However, the proportion of outstanding shares held by the state has been shown to have a negative but insignificant impact on Tobin's Q. recorded a Tobin's Q of 1.5258, while Tobin's Q for the second group (9-11 members) was 1.34296, increasing to 1.54896 for the above 11 board members group .Given a p-value of 0.3619, the impact of board size on Tobin's Q was concluded to be insignificant. Independence was classified under 3 groups with the first group having less than 5 nonexecutive members, second group with 6 to 8 non-executive members and the last group with more than 8 non-executive members. From the analysis, it can be inferred that the group with a relatively smaller number of non-executive directors performed better than companies with a relatively larger number of non-executive directors as depicted by the ROE of 21.3462 and NPM of 16.791 being the highest values. Mixed results were however discovered for the impact of board independence on the performance indicators. The p-value for ROE and NPM was 0.0001 and 0.0058 respectively implying that there is a significant impact of board independence on both ROE and NPM. However, no significant impact was recorded for ROA and Tobin's Q as their P-values of 0.2683 and 0.3735 were above the 5% acceptable error margin. Table 4 .9 reports on the impact of board diversity (BG) on firm performance. For this section only 2 classifications were used. The first group was made up of boards with less than 2 female directors while the second group was made up of boards with more than 2 female directors represented the second group. An increase in performance was identified for ROA, NPM and Tobin's Q as the number of females on the board became greater than 2, this was however not the case with ROE as the first group had an ROE of -3.9852, there was a further decrease to -361.111. Regardless of the above inferences, the P-values of ROA, ROE, NPM and Tobin's Q were 0.3017, 0.8756, 0.1339 and 0.5269 respectively indicating that there is no significant impact of the board gender diversity on performance. Table 4 .10 presents the ANOVA analysis on the impact of the proportion of outstanding shares owned by the top twenty percent of shareholders on the firm's performance. The sampled companies were group into three and their average performance in terms of ROA, ROE, NPM and Tobin's Q. The ANOVA test reports an F-statistic of 1.00 with a p-value of 0.4830 by comparing the average ROA for the three groups. This implies no significant difference in ROA for the three groups and hence we conclude that the percentage of top twenty ownership does not have a significant impact on ROA. Similar results were discovered for ROE and Tobin's Q as their P-values were 0.9802 and 0.2752 respectively.
ANOVA ANALYSIS OF BOARD SIZE
ANOVA ANALYSIS OF BOARD INDEPENDENCE
ANOVA ANALYSIS OF BOARD GENDER
ANOVA ANALYSIS OF TOP TWENTY OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
Contrary to the findings above, the ANOVA test reported an F-statistic of 1.70 with a p-value of 0.0423 by comparing the average NPM for the three groups. This therefore implies significant difference in NPM for the three groups and hence the conclusion that the proportion of outstanding shares owned by the top twenty percent of shareholders does have a significant impact on NPM at the 5% level of confidence. Table 4 .13 compares the average ROA, ROE, NPM and Tobin's Q for firms based on how frequently audit meetings are held. The frequency of Audit meetings were put into 3 groups , the first being less than 5 meetings a year, second group being between 5 to 10 meetings and the last group having more than 10 meetings. The average ROA for firms with less than 5 meetings per year was 7.90381, firms who held 6 -10 meetings was -0.06698 and 5.90381
ANOVA ANALYSIS OF STATE OWNERSHIP
ANOVA ANALYSIS OF AUDIT COMMITTEE SIZE
ANOVA ANALYSIS OF THE FREQUENCY OF AUDIT COMMITTEE MEETINGS
for firms who held more than 10 audit meetings. The F-statistic was 3.24 with p-value of 0.0039, indicating that the frequency of audit committee meetings has a significant impact on firm performance (ROA). The remaining performance indicators ROE, NPM and Tobin's Q yield the same results as did ROA. Their p-values were 0.0000, 0.0076 and 0.0068 respectively indicating that the number of meetings held by the audit committee has a significant impact on firm performance. Table 4 .13 indicate that the age of firms have a significant impact on ROA, NPM and Tobin's Q as their respective p-values are less than the 5% level of confidence. The impact of firm age on ROE was however insignificant as its p-value was 0.4176 which lies above the 5% level of confidence. Table 4 .14 however also shows that size of firm has a significant impact on NPM as its p-value was 0.0000. Table 4 .16 also reports results for the impact of debt to equity ratio on performance. Table   4 .16 shows the F-statistics and their respective p-values for the performance indicators. And from these results, debt to equity ratio has a significant impact on ROA and Tobin's Q as their respective p-values lie below the 5% level of confidence. However, debt to equity ratio has no significant impact on ROA and NPM.
ANOVA ANALYSIS OF FIRM AGE
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Discussion
The first hypothesis (H1) suggests that there predict positive relationship between the number of independence and firm performance. The findings revealed a negative relationship between board independence and all the performance indicators. This implies that the performance of firms tends to decrease as the number of non-executive directors increased in relation to the executive directors. Therefore, the hypothesis is rejected. Our finding is consistent with previous studies (see.e.g Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001; Agrawal & Knoeber,1996; Azez, 2015) , and conclude that outsiders on the board does not help performance. While on the other hand, this is contrary to findings of studies such as Black et al. (2006) Zhuang,1999; Hiraki et al., 2003; Heugens et al., 2009 ) who also asserted that companies with higher ownership concentration performed better. Moreover, the result for State ownership shows that there is no association with firm performance, thus, H5 is rejected. This finding is consist with the result of Xu and Wang (1999) who conclude that State ownership is considered irrelevant to the company profitability. Our finding did not find support H6 as the result indicates no relationship between audit committee size and company performance. Our result is consistent with previous studies (Rebeiz and Salameh, 2006; Sharma et al., 2009 Al-Mamun, 2014 ). Hypnosis 7 predicts that the number of audit comment meeting would be positively associated with firm performance. Contrary to H7, the result showed a significant negative relationship between number of audit committee meetings and ROE and ROA. The result in consistent with (Menon and Williams, 1994) .
This could be due to the increased costs for holding frequent meetings as well as the reverse in changes of decision taken in earlier meetings (Al-Mamun, 2014) .
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Corporate Governance has been identified as a very intense and controversial area aspect of the business administration literature. The increasing need to understand the relationship between governance and firm performance is therefore of the essence (Kraus and Britzelmaier 2011) . This study examined the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance of listed firms in Ghana. The corporate governance indicators used for this study included board size, board independence, board gender, ownership structure and effective audit committee. We demonstrated a mixed result in terms of the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. This in our view demonstrates the need not only for a uniform corporate governance code for companies operating in an emerging market but also the need for company specific approaches based on good governance practice. Across all the indicators used, our results demonstrate an overwhelming support for the impact of good corporate governance on firm performance.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
A major limitation of the study is that data used is predominately collected from annual reports and thus may not be a true reflection of the state of affairs of the company since the regulatory and monitoring framework may be considered to be weaker in emerging markets than in matured markets. In addition, data used for the study covered a period of 5 years from 2008 to 2012 due to gaps in the data set outside of this range. We are of the view that a study covering a wider period could improve the quality of results generated. While we established a relationship between corporate governance and firm performance using companies across a range of industrial sectors, an industry based analysis of firms on the Ghanaian Stock Exchange, examining the relationship between director and board composition, ownership structure and corporate control would provide deeper insights into the specific impact corporate governance has on various industries based on their peculiar characteristics and operations. This was however not possible due to the small number of listed firms on the exchange. Increasing the number of variables explored by studying the impact CEO tenure and duality, board equity ownership, executive compensation and remuneration committees on performance, would no doubt increase the validity of the established relationship between good corporate governance and firm performance. Finally, due to missing data for some firms listed on the exchange, our study could not include all the listed firms on the exchange in our sample
